Afghanistan – What should be the End-Game for Troop Withdrawal

In the midst of the confrontational fiasco that is occurring between General McChrystal and the President of the United States, everyone is also attempting to reassess where the United States is with regard to the war in Afghanistan. How are we going to extract our Armed Forces from that arena and leave a stable government in place?

Entry into Afghanistan was as legitimate as one can ever ask for, given the proceeding actions attributed to Osama bin Laden and 9/11. We should have gone there and we should have done what we did prior to our government deciding that Iraq was a better place to bomb, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld. Bad mistake! We lost the big picture and the momentum when we took our eyes off of the prize in Afghanistan to enter into armed conflict in Iraq.

The Taliban had been routed. Schools and jobs were opening to those that had been shoved to the back of the line, namely its women. A relaxation of the strict Fundamentalism thought processes seemed to be giving the country a step up and back into the modern age. Less we forget, Afghanistan was a thriving country with a monarchy in place. Thrown into chaos by the dethroning of the King, Afghanistan has never been able to return to its previous austerity.

With that, I address the real issues, as I see them, as to how we can accomplish the end-game – removing ourselves from Afghanistan with a stable government in place. The method that the was agreed to as the best way to achieve the objective of defeating the Taliban was a Counter-Insurgency whereby we entered the strongholds of the Taliban and wrestle back from them the people being held captive under Taliban rule. Simple as it may seem, the threats to achieving this goal are hidden in the troubled assets that one would need to support a Country-Insurgency.

A stable government showing credibility is a must, local and national elections that are free of corruption, a significant standing army/police forces capable of maintaining order within the country with the added ability to repel hostile forces. Afghanistan does not, has never had, these basic elements to support its governmental structure. We were able to accomplish those basics within the Iraqi government on account of the cooperation that was garnered with the different sects/sheiks controlling Baghdad and the surrounding country.

Those objectives have not been reached in Afghanistan because the tribal and territorial leaders of Afghanistan are not ready to accept the concept of a central government. In Afghanistan, there is not the infrastructure presented in Iraq… Afghanistan is far-flung and isolated – a state of being that belies any hopes of making the governmental connections needed to corral the country’s local governments.

Genghis Khan was the last true ruler of Asian. Genghis Khan accomplished his amazing feat using fear and rewards – oppose him and receive his wrath; join him and enjoy the rewards of having done so. Vice-President Biden offered the best method of doing both by suggesting that we introduce the ‘drone’ to Afghanistan as a means of striking down those whom would offer resistance to a unified Afghanistan, but even that approach would require a standing army capable of keeping the peace when the United States’ Armed Forces are withdrawn.

An example of the leadership that is necessary for Afghanistan to succeed - the Republic of South Africa. President Mandela grasped the reins of his country, averted civil war, and lead his countrymen to a successful transition of power from the elitist class to the working class gentry of that country - that is what is needed by the people of Afghanistan and nothing less will do.

Without strong leadership, a significant standing army, and local police forces there will be no opportunity to withdraw honorably from Afghanistan. A significant standing army with local police forces should be an integral part of any end-game objective!

In a democracy, silence is not golden; it is condonance in the face of injustices; it is fear, where the thought of reprisal fosters control – Rodney A. Davis

Why Afghanistan is the New Viet Nam

On October 7 of 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan began. The aim of that invasion, as clearly stated by then President Bush, was to find Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al-Qaeda members and put them on trial, to destroy the whole organization of Al-Qaeda, and to remove the Taliban regime which supported and gave safe harbor to Al-Qaeda. This is the eighth year of our involvement in Afghanistan with no clear end in sight.

Since no clear exit strategy has ever been developed for Afghanistan, one is left with no hope that we will ever get out of Afghanistan. The Taliban were allowed to return to a position of strength in the rural areas of Afghanistan while the Bush Administration turned to new opportunities to bomb other countries with no exit strategy in place again. The invasion of Iraq (March of 2003) was the turning point in the war in Afghanistan.

At issue, whether we can ever walk away from Afghanistan. Afghanistan is more like Viet Nam for these reasons:

1. Lack of a strong government in place.
2. Lack of a disciplined standing Army.
3. Widespread political corruption.
4. No local authoritative forces to protect the people.

Refreshing the memory of those, that view Viet Nam as history, consider that the invasion of Viet Nam was not conventional in any way. Our involvement began as ‘military advisors’ to the South Vietnamese Army and escalated to direct involvement with the placement to a puppet government that never gained the confidence of the Vietnamese people.

“While the country was plunged in unprecedented turmoil and on the verge of collapse, the government adopted a strange attitude, a silence that was hard to understand except for a few appearances on TV and radio by President Thieu. People asked themselves questions and they tried to answer them themselves. Rumors circulated in place of government announcements. The Ministry of Information was mute, because the minister himself did not know much about the situation and did not know what the president’s intention was. Furthermore, he didn’t dare to take the initiative and talk about the things the president might not like or agree with.”

President Karzai is contributing to his country’s downfall by his obsession with retaining control with bribes and fraudulent election results. Much of what Karzai is doing mirrors the mistakes that President Thieu made by during the Viet Nam war. He is blaming the United States for failures consistent with what the government of Afghanistan has failed to accomplish… building a standing army, protection of the people of Afghanistan, and creating an atmosphere that would promote the agricultural strengths of Afghanistan. The poppy crop has continued to grow under the direction of members of Karzai’s family with impunity. The profits from narcotics is fueling the efforts of the Taliban because local governments can't stop the cultivation.

The insurgency, occupying tribal parts of Pakistan, is similar in scale to that of Viet Nam with the influx of guerrilla troops from neighboring Laos and Cambodia. The United States is ignoring these similarities at its peril. It's been reliably reported that Iran is also shaping the complexity of the war in Afghanistan as well.

The parallel is so similar between the two countries that it is frightening. Frightening because the United States is committing the same mistakes with zeal… we are assuming that we are superior! The countryside is in the hands of the enemy as with Viet Nam. The influx of American troops to shore up the government is another classic mistake, in that no local forces are being prepared to hold ground taken by U.S. forces.

With predictability, we will lose the war in Afghanistan if we cannot effectively reverse the trends that led to the capitulation of Viet Nam. We must withdraw from Iraq at a suitable time. Reducing the fronts will allow re-distribution of troops and resources. Strengthening the outlying provincial villages will take time, but should be a priority if we are to control the reach of the Taliban and gain the trust of the people of Afghanistan.


In a democracy, silence is not golden; it is condonance in the face of injustices; it is fear, where the thought of reprisal fosters control. – Rodney A. Davis